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N SEEKING an answer to the question of where to sue in avia-
tion products liability cases, plaintiff's counsel is often present-
ed with many alternatives. Since this type of action is seldom limited
by state boundaries, he has the unique opportunity of selecting his
forum and his adversaries. This is an initial advantage which should
not be wasted, but should be utilized to the utmost, by choosing
the court, whether state or federal, where the most equitable and
most favorable results can be expected for his client. Nowhere in
tort law is this more important, since the typical case arises out of
an accident in a remote and distant location, usually involving sev-
eral possible non-resident defendants. The choice of forum will
determine future proceedings and could well mean the difference
between a well-prepared case and a successful trial or a disastrous
result after thousands of hours of wasted effort. The decision as to
where to file suit is necessarily dependent on who will be the de-
fendants. Accordingly, plaintiff's counsel must give thoughtful
consideration to the selection of parties, as it is related to the
choice of forum.
The ideal forum for the trial of an aviation products liability
case, as any other, is in a friendly court, where plaintiff's attorney
has had a long association with the judge, knows the court attach6s,
the clerks, the bailiffs or marshals, the reporters, has appeared
frequently, and is very familiar with the procedures. Of course, it
may not be an advantage to be on a first-name basis with the judge,
but it certainly would not hurt plaintiff's case. This forum is in his
'Attorney at law, San Francisco, California. William B. Smith, Esq. of San
Francisco, Calif. assisted in the preparation of the article and did much of the
legal research.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
own backyard, rather than the defendant's, where plaintiff's attor-
ney, and possibly the plaintiff and some of his witnesses, are known,
liked and respected. Unfortunately, this type of case infrequently is
tried in such a court.
In aviation products litigation the plaintiff's attorney usually has
many forums from which to choose, and they increase with the
number of possible defendants. In addition to the manufacturer of
the aircraft, they include: the manufacturers of components and
sub-assemblies within them; the distributors; the owner and former
owner; and maintenance facilities and fixed base operators, along
with the pilot or his estate. As numerous defendants add to the
various possible forums, they complicate selection of the proper
one. The inclusion of one defendant may prevent filing in the court
of choice or create the danger of removal. In such a case, consider-
ation must be given as to the necessity of his presence as a party.
Additionally, when selecting a particular court, the plaintiff's at-
torney must always give thought to possible future motions by a
defendant to change venue, dismiss or remove the case to a federal
court, and steps should be taken early to block such moves.
Accordingly, the skilled plaintiff's attorney gives as much thought
to his choice of forum as he does to his discovery, preparation for
trial and trial itself. He conducts thorough legal research and fac-
tual investigation, knowing that his decision may well determine
his success in the proceedings which follow. This article outlines
for the plaintiff's attorney various factors he should consider in
making his choice between the state and federal forum and, within
these judicial systems, the particular court, whether in a district,
county or other political subdivision. The choice-influencing factors
considered will be jurisdictional requirements as to subject matter
and person, venue, choice of law rules, and general considerations
such as procedures and ease of discovery, rules of evidence and
other matters felt to be relevant. Areas of federally-created law
will be discussed, such as the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Federal
Death on the High Seas Act, Multidistrict Litigation Panel, and ad-
miralty jurisdiction, some of which are applicable to state courts
also. Emphasis will be placed on the choice between the state and
federal forums and the strategy involved in insuring that plaintiff's
choice will not be disturbed by a defendant. Since most attorneys
are familiar with their own state practice, that of the federal courts
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will be highlighted. The advantages and disadvantages of state
forums can be discussed only in general terms because of the great
variation in their practices.
QUALITIES OF THE IDEAL FORUM
Undoubtedly, if other factors were equal, the best forum would
be the local one, where the attorney knows the judge and court
personnel quite well and is thoroughly familiar with the practice
and rules of procedure. This is where the plaintiff's attorney will
want to try his case if at all possible. Easy accessibility to the
courthouse is very comfortable. He does not have to go far to file
papers, check records, make and oppose motions, attend settlement
and pretrial conferences, and try the case. All too often, unfortun-
ately, he lets the advantage of his "home town" dictate his choice
when other and more important factors make it wiser to file in a
federal court or a distant court in his state, where he would have
better law, more far-ranging discovery or a potentially higher ver-
dict.
The goal of plaintiff's counsel is to file suit and try his aviation
products case in the forum, whether federal or state, possessing the
following four qualities, listed here not necessarily in order of im-
portance:
1. Liberal Products Liability Law
About half of the states have adopted the doctrine of strict lia-
bility, at least as it is expressed in the Restatement of Torts, Sec-
tion 402A. California has progressed beyond it and no longer
requires that the product be "unreasonably dangerous." It was
recently held that "unreasonable" is a negligence concept and has
no basis in the law of strict liability.1 Of course, contributory negli-
gence is no defense, and that includes the failure to discover the
defect In California the defect can be patent and obvious' and
misuse of the product is no defense to the manufacturer if it was
1 Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1972).
'Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972);
Ruiz v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 462, 93 Cal. Rptr. 270
(1971).
'Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
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foreseeable.' Additionally, even tllfough the manufacturer may have
discovered a defect in his product and issued a warning to the em-
ployer of an injured plaintiff, the employer's disregard of it is not
a defense if it was reasonably foreseeable."
2. Jurisdiction And Venue Over Crucial Defendants
Without this quality, plaintiff's attorney may find himself defend-
ing the conduct of an absent defendant, rather than attacking it.
If a potentially responsible defendant is not a party, the others will
undoubtedly point the finger of blame at him. If he is not there to
defend himself, plaintiff may have to do so. It is far preferable for
all potentially responsible defendants to be before the same court,
where they can present their defenses, cross-complain and fight
among themselves if they wish, helping the plaintiff's case at the
same time. It is music to a plaintiff's attorney's ear to hear defense
counsel tell the jury that the crash was a terrible tragedy, depriving
a widow and orphan of their breadwinner, that they should be ade-
quately compensated, but by the other defendants, not his client.
3. The Most Liberal Discovery Rules
This forum would be in the federal court and in states which
have adopted the Federal Rules, or patterned their own discovery
statutes after them. Unfortunately, there are still quite a few states
where the "fishing expedition" objection is still sustained. The heart
of an aviation products liability case is discovery, which necessitates
easy access to thousands of documents in the manufacturer's file
cabinets, running from original design proposals and engineering
changes to service department deficiency, defect and malfunction
reports. The plaintiff's attorney must also have the opportunity to
take depositions of scores of personnel in the design, engineering,
manufacturing, quality control, service and sales departments.
Federal Rule 26(b), the key to the federal discovery process,
establishes a broad standard of relevancy.' It provides that any
party may obtain discovery of any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter of the action and reasonably calcu-
'Thompson v. Package Mach. Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 188; 99 Cal. Rptr. 281
(1971).
'Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890
(1972).
' FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 (discovery rules).
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lated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at trial. It
applies to all five of the major discovery rules with only a few ex-
ceptions.
The 1970 amendments made remarkable changes in other fed-
eral discovery rules, particularly rule 34, which permits production,
inspection or copying of documents, and inspection of objects
relevant to the case, such as aircraft wreckage. Rule 34 is a key to
the aviation plaintiff who must rely on thousands of documents
possessed by the defendant to prepare his case. Prior to 1970, their
production could be made only upon court order after a showing of
good cause. The amendments deleted these requirements and sub-
stituted the "Request for Production of Documents," putting the
burden on the defendant to reply within 30 days, wherein he must
state which requested items will be made available and the reasons
he objects to those not produced. [Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 34(b).] The validity of his objections may be tested in
court on a noticed motion [37(a)]. If no response is made, plaintiff
may move for sanctions [37(d)]. This revised procedure was de-
signed to encourage extra-judicial and more informal discovery and
reduce the number of court appearances.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to any action
brought in federal court, including those in admiralty and ones
which have been removed from state court.7 Since pretrial discovery
is such a major factor in the ultimate disposition of an aviation
products case, the plaintiff's attorney should assign great weight to
it in making his choice between state and federal forums, if their
discovery rules differ materially.
4. Expected Jury Verdict
One of the most important factors in the choice of forum, be it
federal or state, is the expected amount of the jury verdict. The
ultimate value of a case, whether determined by settlement or trial,
is dependent upon trial locale. It is common knowledge that
throughout this country there are high and low verdict areas, with
California, New York, Illinois and Florida taking the lead. How-
ever, even within these states, areas-distant from the big cities-
small towns, farming communities, bedroom suburbs, and places
where the pace is slower and the attitude conservative-produce
7Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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lower verdicts. Since the purpose of filing a suit is to obtain fair
compensation for his clients, the plaintiff's attorney must give the
highest consideration to filing in the forum which will produce a
damage award commensurate with the losses sustained.
GENERAL AND PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
Other considerations, both general and procedural, should be
kept in mind when choosing a forum. The degree of court conges-
tion varies in different areas of the country, both in state and fed-
eral courts. In some areas it is possible to go to trial within six
months of filing, while in others, such as Chicago and New York,
it takes four to five years. The financial ability of the plaintiffs to
survive the delay may become a factor.
The nature of pretrial proceedings varies widely. Generally
speaking, the federal forum asserts a greater degree of control over
the case, since customarily it is assigned to one judge who stays
with it from beginning to end. A plaintiff's attorney, as well as de-
fense counsel, may not desire the consequent restriction on his free-
dom of action. Some districts require counsel to attend periodic
status conferences so that the judge can keep abreast of develop-
ments in the case and direct future proceedings. Pretrial conference
statements in the federal courts are usually much longer and more
detailed than those in the states, requiring a complete listing of
witnesses, documents and even the expected testimony. Very often
state courts do not even require pretrial conferences and permit
counsel for both plaintiff and defendant to proceed at their own
paces.
A disadvantage to the federal forum from the plaintiff's view-
point is the requirement that jury verdicts be unanimous. Any
plaintiff's attorney can recite instances where a hung jury resulted
when the division was nine-to-three or ten-to-two in his client's
favor, whereas in a state court he would have had a verdict. Most
state forums require that only three-quarters or five-sixths of the
jurors concur. The composition of the federal jury panel is often
drawn from the judicial district rather than from the county in
which the court sits, as in the case of a state forum. This practice
usually results in a more heterogeneous jury. People tend to regard
service on the federal jury as being more prestigious than serving
in the county. As a general rule, a federal jury consists of more
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self-employed persons than employees of large corporations, a
greater percentage of male jurors, and those of a higher socio-eco-
nomic status, and not as many retired people as on state juries!B
The plaintiff's attorney must decide which type of jury panel is
best suited for his case.
The subpoena power of the state court is limited to state boun-
daries and frequently to a specific distance, such as 150 miles, from
where it sits. On the other hand, federal district courts may sub-
poena witnesses residing anywhere in the district where the court
is sitting or within 100 miles of the courthouse even though across
state boundaries.' This difference may be important to plaintiff's
counsel who anticipates he will have difficulty obtaining the attend-
ance of unwilling witnesses.
The quality of the judiciary, best known by local practitioners, is
certainly a factor to be considered in the choice of forum. Most
state judges are elected to their positions for a specific term, where-
as federal judges are appointed for life. The ranks of the federal
bench may contain the antiquated tyrant, but also the enlightened
student of the law who is unafraid to depart from the past and
agree with the plaintiff's attorney that the time has come for new
principles of law, as in the products liability field, reflecting the
need for consumer protection. It is generally accepted that the
quality of the federal bench is higher. One reason may be the train-
ing and experience received-by most as state judges before appoint-
ment. The occupants of the federal bench usually require a greater
degree of court decorum, and discipline is more readily enforced
on the federal level. On the other hand, the state judiciary usually
operates on a more informal basis.
It is the general practice in federal court for the judge to conduct
practically all of the voir dire examination, limiting severely the
questions an attorney may ask. On the other hand, in most state
courts there is more liberality and the attorney is able to conduct
his own voir dire, asking searching and far-reaching questions
which will permit him to evaluate the prospective jurors, his pur-
pose being to obtain at least an impartial panel, if he is not lucky
IR. LAVINE & G. HORNING, MANUAL OF FEDERAL PRACTICE, Jury, 5 1.13, at
30 (1967).
9 FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(1); Wallace Prod. Inc. v. Falco Prod. Inc., 193 F.
Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
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enough to have his cousins on the jury or members of the church
where he sings in the choir. All trial attorneys know that the com-
position of the panel is extremely important. No matter how good
a plaintiff's case is, liability clear, and the law on his side, if it
begins with a jury which is biased or prejudiced against plaintiff's
interest, he will have little chance of success. Therefore, the plain-
tiff's counsel's right to voir dire is an extremely important factor to
be considered in making a choice of forum.
Another consideration, possibly of less importance, is the right
of the federal judiciary to comment on the evidence. Any experi-
enced trial lawyer is well aware that the jury is easily influenced by
the attitude of the court toward his case, even though it may be
expressed subtly. A federal judge can advise the jury that he be-
lieves a witness, that certain testimony is inherently probable or
improbable, and comment on the worth of a case as a whole. Most
state judges do not have this power, and it has often been held
judicial error for a judge to express his feelings to a jury. Also, in
federal court, the judge's power to grant directed verdicts is much
greater than in a state court. This would be a consideration to a
plaintiff's attorney only if he had a very weak case and was worried
about a nonsuit or a directed verdict.
THE RISK OF CONSOLIDATION BY JUDICIAL PANEL ON
MULTIDISTRICT LIMGATION
A more specific procedural difference between state and federal
courts encountered in aviation products liability cases is the possi-
bility of pretrial consolidation in the federal courts. Customarily,
the plaintiff's attorney has a great amount of leeway in the manner
in which he prepares his aviation case. This discretion may be se-
verely restricted, however, if the case is in federal court and is
factually related to cases pending in other districts, involves un-
usual multiplicity or complexity of factual issues, arises from a
common disaster, or is a products liability case. In these cases, the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, created by a recent addi-
tion to the United States Code," is empowered to transfer pending
actions to a single federal district court for coordinated or consoli-
dated pretrial proceedings. This will be done upon the Panel's de-
1028 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970).
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termination that such a transfer will be for the convenience of
parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct
of the action.' The statutory scheme comprehends that after the
pretrial proceedings, the consolidated actions will be remanded
for the purposes of trial to the districts from which they were
transferred.'"
In these types of cases, the clerk of the federal district court in
which an action is pending is required to notify the administrative
office of the United States courts of the existence of such suits for
consideration by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. The
Panel may order pretrial consolidation on its own initiative. In
addition, any party may make a motion seeking a determination
by the Panel that transfer of all related cases for coordinated pre-
trial procedures is appropriate. The Panel's determination is then
made upon notice to interested counsel, after a hearing (which can
be held in any federal district). The ruling of the Panel is not sub-
ject to ordinary appeal procedures, and review may be had only by
extraordinary writ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651.2
Transfer under section 1407 is a mixed bag of blessings for
plaintiff's counsel. The Manual for Complex Litigation promul-
gated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation provides for
the appointment of "liaison" counsel."' Customarily, plaintiff's
liaison counsel is the attorney with the "largest stake" or greatest
number of cases involved. After the appointment of liaison coun-
sel, the conduct of pretrial proceedings, discovery, and tactics are
determined largely by him. While all counsel may have input in his
decisions, it is obvious that attorneys may have competing and
significantly different approaches to the same general task. Also,
aviation accident litigation is normally transferred under section
1407 to the district in which the accident occured," and plaintiff's
counsel may find participation in pretrial discovery highly imprac-
tical, either because of calendar conflicts or because of tactical
economic considerations.
128 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970).
1228 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1970).
328 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (1970).
14 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION § 1.90 (C.C.H. 3d
ed. 1973).
"In re Air Crash Disaster at Tweed-New Haven Airport, 343 F. Supp. 951
(J.P.M.L. 1972).
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Furthermore, despite the provisions of section 1407 (a) that con-
solidated cases "shall be remanded... at or before the conclusion
of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was trans-
ferred unless it shall have been previously terminated . . .", there
is recent authority that the transferee court has the power under
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to refuse to remand, and consolidate the ac-
tions for trial in the transferee district." The inconvenience and im-
practicality which may result from pretrial transfer may thus con-
tinue through the trial itself. The Pfizer decision is contrary to the
letter and spirit of the federal transfer of venue section, but must
be considered with potential 1407-type cases.'
On the other hand, consolidation of cases for pretrial discovery
may enable counsel to take advantage of the experience of his more
learned colleagues. Often the liaison counsel will be an experienced
trial lawyer, with many years of aviation litigation behind him;
nevertheless, there is no guarantee that this "experienced litigator"
will obtain all the information that an absent counsel might deem
appropriate. In addition, a common hazard to the "coat-tailing"
plaintiff's attorney is the possibility that liaison counsel, who has
done most of the work and is best informed to prepare the first
case, may settle and leave the other plaintiff's counsel in the lurch
and unprepared.
Thus when counsel is involved in a mass disaster accident or
products case of wide applicability, it is imperative to decide
whether to seek or oppose consolidation under section 1407. As
stated in section 1407, the fundamental criteria relevant to a
determination of whether to transfer are "the convenience of parties
and witnesses" and the "just and efficient conduct of such action";
however, the panel will also take into consideration whether or not
the common questions of fact are sufficiently complex to warrant
consolidation.8 Commentators have urged other criteria which in-
clude convenience of counsel; central geographic location; adequate
transportation, lodging, and restaurant facilities; adequate court-
1 Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971).
1728 U.S.C. 5 1404(a) (1970).
1" See Comment, Consolidation and Transfer in the Federal Courts: 28 U.S.C.
Section 1407 Viewed in Light of Rule 42(a) and 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a), 22
HAsT. L.J. 1289 (1971), for arguments supporting trial in transferor court after
complete pretrial.
"92 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1901 (1968).
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house; and adequate document reproduction facilities in the trans-
feree district."0 Consideration must be given to the number of cases
involved, and if that number is low, a party seeking 1407 transfer
may have a strong burden to show that the common questions of
fact are so complex and the necessary discovery so lengthy as to
overcome the inconvenience to a party whose case is being trans-
ferred."
Implicit in the Panel's decision to transfer is the selection of the
transferee district. Generally, aviation accident cases are transferred
to the place of the crash, where witnesses and documents are pre-
sumably available for pretrial discovery.2 However, cases have been
sent to the district where the defendant manufactures its aircraft,
engine, or component part." Other factors may affect the selection,
such as the number of suits pending in the various districts. The
one with the greatest number has been held the most convenient
district for pretrial consolidation." Finally, a relevant, though
necessarily delicate, factor is the ability of the transferee judge to
conduct the complex pretrial and discovery proceedings."
It is apparent that the possibility of transfer under section 1407
is a factor for consideration when choosing a forum. It can be
avoided only if the suit is in a state court and there is no possibility
of removal."
PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
A final federal-state choice influencing factor remains on the
horizon. Whenever the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence finally
become effective, their liberality may make the federal forum more
20Farrell, Multidistrict Litigation in Aviation Accident Cases, 38 J. AIR L. &
COM. 159, 163 (1973).
21 In re Scotch Whiskey, 229 F. Supp. 543 (J.P.M.L. 1969) (transfer refused).
Transfer was ordered for 30 cases filed in 7 federal district courts, in re Midair
Collision Near Fairland, Ind., 309 F. Supp. 621 (J.P.M.L. 1970); transfer was
refused for 21 cases filed in 5 district courts in In re Air Crash Disaster at Falls
City, Neb., 298 F. Supp. 1323 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
11 In re Air Crash Disaster at Tweed-New Haven Airport, 343 F. Supp. 951
(J.P.M.L. 1972).
'-In re Aviation Prod. Liab. Litigation, 357 F. Supp. 1401 (J.P.M.L. 1972).
' In re Midair Collision Near Fairland, Ind., 309 F. Supp. 621 (J.P.M.L.
1970).
In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 315 F. Supp. 317 (J.P.M.L. 1970).
2" In re Antibiotic Drugs, 299 F. Supp. 1403 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
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attractive to plaintiff." Of course, this depends on the particular
case and the comparative liberality of state rules of evidence. 8 The
Proposed Rules are very similar to the California Evidence Code,
and not unexpectedly because they served as the model.
Probably the most revolutionary change made in the Supreme
Court draft of the Proposed Rules is the relaxation of the hearsay
rule. The House Judiciary Committee made several changes in the
original draft limiting the autonomy of the Supreme and lower
federal courts to adopt new rules and exceptions," but the thrust
of the Supreme Court draft remains basically unchanged. Hearsay
is defined, and its exceptions are listed in five rules in the House
draft." Examples of this narrowing of the hearsay rule include the
The Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, appointed by the United
States Supreme Court, approved a uniform set of federal evidence rules on No-
vember 20, 1972. Order, 56 F.R.D. 183 (Sup. Ct. 1972). These rules, which were
to become effective July 1, 1973, were submitted to the Congress on February 5,
1973. The House Judiciary Committee's Special Subcommittee on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws (now renamed the Criminal Justice Subcommittee) de-
cided that it would be impossible to analyze the proposed Rules (H.R. 5463, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)) by the July 1, 1973 date; so, it sought and obtained legis-
lation to delay the effective date of the Rules until they were expressly approved
by Congress. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, § 1, 87 Stat. 9 applying
28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1949).
The Subcommittee held hearings during the spring of 1973; and on June 28,
1973 circulated a provisional draft of the Rules which was published in the Con-
gressional Record. The Subcommittee's final report on its draft of the rules was
October 10, 1973, and the full Judiciary Committee approved the Subcommittee
draft on November 15, 1973. A hearing on H. R. 5463 was held before the House
on February 6, 1974, and the bill was passed and published in the Congressional
Record of that date. The Rules were referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee
on February 7, 1974.
2' For articles written about the United States Supreme Court draft of the
Rules, see generally Symposium on the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence (pts.
1 & 2), 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1076, and 16 WAYNE L. REV. 134 (1969); Schwartz,
The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: An Introduction and Critique, 38 CINN.
L. REV. 449 (1969); Blackmar, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence - How
Will They Affect the Trial of Cases?, 27 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 17 (1970).
2 E.g., in the area of hearsay, the House draft omits two "catch-all" hearsay
exceptions from the Supreme Court draft-that is, rules 803(24) and 804(b) (6).
Both of them would admit into evidence: "A statement not specifically covered
by any of the foregoing exceptions but having comparable circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness." This change was accompanied by a revision in the word-
ing of Rule 802 (the hearsay rule) which has the effect of preventing the Supreme
Court from adopting new hearsay exceptions without prior statutory authority.
"0 Rule 801 (Defines hearsay and statements which are not hearsay); Rule 802
(The hearsay rule); Rule 803 (The 23 hearsay exceptions where availability of
the declarant is not a factor); Rule 804 (Defines availability and lists five hear-
say exceptions if the declarant is unavailable as a witness); Rule 805 (Hearsay
within hearsay is not excluded if each part of the combined statements fits within
a hearsay exception).
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following: (1) nonverbal conduct of a person is a statement for
hearsay purposes only if it is assertive conduct [Rule 801 (a) (2)];
(2) prior inconsistent statements of a witness given under oath and
subject to cross examination may be used for substantive purposes
in addition to impeachment [Rule 801(d) (1)]; (3) party oppo-
nent admissions are treated as hearsay exclusions rather than hear-
say exceptions [Rule 801 (d) (2)]; (4) the dying declaration
abandons the common law restriction to criminal homicide and ap-
plies it, as well, to civil actions [Rule 804(b) (3)]; a declaration
against interest is expanded beyond statements against pecuniary or
proprietary interests to include statements subjecting the declarant
to civil or criminal liability [Rule 804(b) (4)]. The preceding ex-
amples only illustrate a few of the important alterations made to
the hearsay rule and its exceptions.
Another important area of evidence affected by the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence is privilege31 [Rules 501-513]. Some of
the traditional provisions have been excluded or limited while oth-
ers are broadened. For example, the scope of the attorney-client
privilege is expanded and is set out in detail [Rule 503]; the gov-
ernment privilege for secrets of state and other official information
is greatly expanded and strengthened [Rule 509]; the physician-
patient privilege is rejected for a broad psychotherapist-patient
privilege [Rule 504]; and, the privilege for confidential communi-
cations between husband and wife-that is, the privilege not to
testify against one's spouse-is excluded and the only marital privi-
lege remaining is the limited privilege of a criminal defendant to
keep his or her spouse from testifying [Rule 505].
An early problem with federally-created privileges was the ex-
tent to which the federal privileges could preempt state privileges,
given the dictate of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins." The Supreme Court's
Advisory Committee rejected the claim that Erie required recogni-
tion of state privilege rules.' However, Congress changed rule 501
of the Supreme Court draft to add the following statement: "...
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an ele-
ment of a claim or defense as to which state law supplies the rule
31 FED. R. EVID. 501-13.
3304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See Rule 501 of the original Supreme Court draft, Order, 56 F.R.D. 183,
230-34 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
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of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State
or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance
with state law. '"' Congress has determined that the weight of author-
ity requires the application of the state law privileges when state
substantive law is applicable-for example, in diversity of citizen-
ship cases. Thus, if the Federal Rules finally become effective in ac-
cordance with the House draft, choice between evidentiary privi-
leges will not need to enter into plaintiff's determination as to
whether to sue in state or federal court, when the potential basis for
subject matter jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship.
It would be advisable for counsel practicing in the Federal
Courts to obtain a copy of the House draft of the Rules so that he
may compare it to the Supreme Court draft and study both in prep-
aration for the upcoming application of the federal rules to the
federal courts. A copy of the Supreme Court draft of the Rules can
be found in 56 Federal Rules Decisions 183 [1972] or in 34 Law-
yer's Edition 2d 7 [1973]. The House draft of the Rules can be
found in the February 6, 1974 Congressional Record-House, H 543-
570, wherein the Rules were debated and were passed. Interested
counsel might also obtain a copy of H. R. 5463 itself [Report 93-
650, 93rd Congress, 1st Session], which also outlines the changes
the House made in the Supreme Court's original draft.
CHOOSING THE COMPETENT COURT-
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
A. Jurisdiction Generally
Jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine a
particular case brought before it. This judicial power is created by
legislative and/or constitutional mandate, and exists only where the
court has been given authority to decide a particular type of case
involving certain types of litigants, most commonly described as
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties. There is
not too much difference between the state and federal forums as to
jurisdiction over the parties. However, there is a large difference in
the scope of jurisdiction over the subject matter. States have gen-
eral subject matter jurisdiction, meaning authority to hear all
matters which are not precluded by the state constitution or statutes
*4 119 CONG. REC. H549 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974) (emphasis added).
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or within the exclusive realm of the federal courts. On the other
hand, subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to
those powers granted by the United States Constitution, Article III,
Section 2, Clause 1, and by congressional enactment. 5
B. Diversity of Citizenship
The most common basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction is
diversity of citizenship, as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332. It gives the
district court exclusive jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $10,000, exclusive of
interest and costs and is between (1) citizens of different states;
(2) citizens of a state, and foreign states or citizens or subjects
thereof; and (3) citizens of different states in which one state or
citizens or subjects thereof are additional parties. In essence, citi-
zens of different states in the United States or citizens of a state and
aliens may sue each other in federal court, provided the amount in
controversy exceeds $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs and
there is jurisdiction over the parties and the notice requirements of
due process are satisfied.
For diversity purposes, citizenship of a natural person means
both citizenship of the United States and of a state within it.' Citi-
zenship of a state is analogous to domicile, which is customarily
defined as residence within a state coupled with the present inten-
tion of remaining there permanently or indefinitely;-, it is a question
of fact determined after consideration of all the circumstances.
Unlike natural persons, corporations can be citizens of two or
more states. Section 1332(c) of Title 28 of the United States Code
is the source of a corporation's ability to be a "multicitizen," by
providing that it is a citizen of the state or states where it is incor-
porated, as well as the state of its principal place of business. Since
the typical aviation products case involves a number of possible
defendants, the plaintiff's attorney must determine the citizenship
of all of them. The World Aviation Directory, which lists the great
majority of companies doing business in the aviation field, as well
as the geographical spread of each, is a good place to start. Addi-
tionally, inquiry should be made with the Secretary of State, Cor-
35 1 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 0.60[3], at 607 (2d ed. 1974).
36 Delaware L. & W.R.R. v. Petrowsky, 250 F. 554 (2d Cir. 1918).
11 Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1913); Hardin v. McAvoy, 216 F.2d
399 (5th Cir. 1954); Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1954).
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porations Commissioner, or other appropriate official in each state
considered as a potential forum to learn if a defendant is incorpor-
ated or has its principal place of business there.
Determination of a corporation's principal place of business is
not always as easy as its place of incorporation. Commentators
and various circuits have developed many tests for determining the
principal place of business, such as the "nerve center" or "home
office" test,"8 the "center of operations" test," and several variations
on them.' Obviously, the plaintiff's attorney should advocate the
test which will give him the best opportunity of establishing diver-
sity under the circumstances. If it is a toss-up whether it is in one
state or another, the federal court is most likely to find it to be
where diversity jurisdiction will be defeated, on the principle that
it is a court of limited subject matter jurisdiction. This principle
may produce drastic results for the unsuspecting plaintiff's attorney.
For example, if counsel represents a California plaintiff and files in
the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California,
alleging diversity of citizenship against a Delaware corporation, on
the assumption that its principal place of business is in New York,
a finding that it is actually in California would necessitate dis-
missal because of incomplete diversity. This could be disastrous if
the statute of limitations for filing suit has run and there is no other
forum available. As a precaution, counsel must assess this potential
hazard and consider the desirability of a "backup" state court ac-
tion, if one can be filed.
When he has established the citizenship of all potential defend-
ants, the next step is to check that diversity is complete. He must
be sure that no plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any of the
defendants. " The plaintiff who is a citizen of a state which is a
major producer of aircraft and aviation components may very well
have common citizenship with a potential defendant. If his attorney
wishes to stay in federal court, consideration should be given to
leaving the non-diverse defendants out of the lawsuit. Under the
" Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
'Kelly v. U.S. Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1960).
4 See 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 0.77 [3.1 -3.4], at 717.60-.82 (2d ed.
1974); Comment, 47 IOWA L. REV. 1151 (1962).
"' Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806); Quaker State Dyeing
& Finish Co. v. ITT Terryphone Corp., 461 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir. 1972).
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products liability law in most states, the manufacturer of the com-
pleted aircraft is responsible for any defective component it con-
tains, even though made by another. If the component manufacturer
has a common citizenship with the plaintiff, it need not be sued. On
the other hand, if the completed aircraft manufacturer has the com-
mon citizenship, it may be wise to leave it out of the lawsuit as long
as the component maker is included, provided the defective com-
ponent was not altered after it left the maker's possession.
A possible limitation on this approach to a maintenance of di-
versity would be the objection raised by a diverse defendant that
an absent potential defendant is an indispensable party pursuant to
rule 19 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If the potential
defendant's joinder is not feasible because it would destroy diver-
sity, the "equity and good conscience" test of rule 19 (b) is applied
to determine whether or not the absent party is indispensable. The
rule 19(b) test balances four interests: plaintiff's interest in hav-
ing a forum, defendant's interest in avoiding multiple litigation, the
interest of the outsider whom it would have been desirable to join,
and the interests of the courts and the public in complete, consist-
ent and efficient settlement of controversies. If a finding of indispen-
sability is made, the plaintiff's action is dismissed 2 However, there
are ample holdings that a joint tortfeasor is not an indispensable
party. 3
A recent decision may be the beginning of inroads on the re-
quirement of complete diversity. Jacobs v. U.S." held in a Federal
Tort Claims Act case that the doctrine of "pendent jurisdiction"
called for the joinder of a non-diverse defendant, so that all the
plaintiffs' claims could be tried in one forum. The court felt that the
justification for such joinder lies in considerations of judicial econ-
omy, convenience and fairness to litigants. Such considerations
may well be the future basis for joining non-diverse parties in cases
not involving the FTCA.
PREVENTING REMOVAL TO FEDERAL COURT
Plaintiff's counsel must always be wary of the possibility of re-
' Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968);
Schutten v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1970).
' See cases cited in 3A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 19.07[1], at 2226 n.18
(2d ed. 1974).
44367 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Ariz. 1973).
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moval of his case from the state to the federal court, and it is
incumbent on him to consider it before making his initial choice.
Of concern here are the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1441,"' which
permit removal of any civil action if there is not complete diversity
between plaintiffs and defendants or the action is founded on a law
of the United States. Defendant has the absolute right to remove the
action to the federal court for the district in the state in which the
action was brought, as long as there is a basis for original federal
subject matter jurisdiction.
It is obvious that defendant's right of removal is a dangerous
weapon against a plaintiff who has chosen the state forum without
first considering the possibility of removal. He may find himself a
victim of the "hop-skip" tactic. That is, a defendant who is able to
satisfy the removal requirements may then try to transfer the action
to a forum more convenient to him, possibly his home town, under
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), or he may try to consolidate the action with
other similar actions for pretrial under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Multi-
district Litigation). Thus, a plaintiff who originally sought the ad-
vantages of suing in his own bailiwick may find himself litigating
the action in some far-off locale which might provide defendant
with the advantages the plaintiff initially desired. It should be re-
emphasized that removal is defendant's right and that all defend-
ants must join in the petition. However, when the only basis for
original subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court is diversity
of citizenship, a defendant cannot remove if he is a citizen of the
state in which the action is brought, as this would obviously destroy
diversity. At the same time, when defendant relies on a federal
question as the basis for removal, his right is not affected by com-
mon citizenship with the plaintiff."
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by act of Congress, any
civil action brought in a state court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending. (b) Any civil action of which the district courts
have original jurisdiction founded on a claim of right arising under
the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be re-
movable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties.
Any other such actions shall be removable only if none of the par-
ties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen
of the State in which such action is brought. . ..
4' Removal of Cases from State Courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1970); Avco
Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
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Since few, if any, aviation products cases are premised on federal
question subject matter jurisdiction,"7 this brief analysis of removal
will be concerned with protecting the state action by destroying
diversity at the outset. The most common method of spoiling a de-
fendant's removal strategy is to name a single resident defendant in
the state court suit. Care should be taken that a cause of action can
be stated against him and that there is enough evidence available
to resist a motion for summary judgment. In the case of a manu-
facturer, possible local defendants could be sales personnel, tech-
nical representatives stationed with an airline or the military, and
the distributor, whether a direct employee of the company or an
agent or independent contractor. With respect to an airline, possi-
ble local defendants are mechanics, inspectors, company meteor-
ologists, dispatchers and possibly flight crew members.
If plaintiff wants state court jurisdiction at the domicile of a
defendant or at its principal place of business, diversity can possibly
be destroyed by the appointment of a personal representative or by
assignment of the cause of action or part of it to a person who
resides in the same state. 8 Of course, a plaintiff may not want to
go to the extreme of preventing diversity by such a tactic if it in-
volves filing in the court of the home town of a large manufacturer,
which is the beneficent employer of a substantial number of provin-
cial citizens, where the jury would be composed of people well
aware that its financial soundness may affect their livelihood,
though indirectly. A sure-fire way to prevent removal in a diversity
case is for the plaintiff to seek damages no higher than $10,000.
However, this option would seldom be available in an aviation
crash case.
In summary, it is essential that plaintiff's counsel take a close
look at the possibility of removal before he files his state court
action.
11 Arant v. Stover, 307 F. Supp. 144 (D.S.C. 1969). But see Carter v. Sea-
board Coast Line R.R., 318 F. Supp. 368 (D.S.C. 1970), and other cases cited
in Annot., 8 A.L.R. Fed. 845 (1971).
48 Two recent cases split on the issue of whether violation of a Federal Avia-
tion Regulation raised a federal question on which jurisdiction could be based
without diversity. Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972)
(upheld jurisdiction); D'Arcy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 12 Av. Cas. 18,282
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1974) (denied jurisdiction).
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THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS
OF FEDERAL SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Before filing suit, the plaintiff's attorney should give considera-
tion to an action against the United States Government under the
Federal Tort Claims Act. The primary section is 28 U.S.C. § 1346
(b) which states as follows:
... [T]he district courts . . .shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
civil actions on claims against the United States, for money dam-
ages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligence or a wrongful act or omission of an em-
ployee of the government while acting within the scope of his of-
fice or employment, under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
Other provisions are scattered throughout the judicial code."
Jurisdiction under this act, as well as the Federal Death on the
High Seas Act, is vested exclusively in the federal courts, unlike
admiralty cases which may be filed in state courts.
Possible bases for suit against the federal government arising
from an aircraft crash include negligent certification of an aircraft
and its components," negligent certification of an airfield," neg-
ligent air traffic control," negligent chart publication," negligent
licensing of an airman," and negligent maintenance of airway fa-
cilities."
Before the plaintiff's attorney attempts to file under the Federal
'28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411(b), 2412,
2671-80.
" Rapp v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd
sub nom. Scot v. Eastern Air Lines, 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 979 (1968); Arney v. United States, 479 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1973).
" Cases cited note 50 supra.
"2Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 911 (1957); Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d
27 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
"Murray v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 835 (D. Utah 1971), modified on
other grounds, 463 F.2d 208 (10th Cir. 1972).
'4(which would seem to be on the same basis as an aircraft.)
"Israel v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), rev'd on insuffi-
ciency of evidence, 247 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1957); see Kennelly, Claims and Suits
for Aviation Accidents Under the F.T.C.A., 16 TRIAL LAW GUIDE 1 (1972);
Comment, F.T.C.A.-Governmental Liability for Negligent Chart Publication and
Aircraft Certification, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1201 (1973); Smith, How to Perfect a
Claim Under the F.T.C.A., 8 LAw NoTEs 41 (1972).
WHERE TO SUE
Tort Claims Act, he should carefully consider the following limita-
tions imposed on such an action. It may not be brought against
the United States under the authority of section 1346(b) until a
claim is first presented to the appropriate federal agency, and it is
actually denied in writing or is deemed finally denied." The claim
requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, 7 its purpose
being to avoid unnecessary trials and to encourage settlement. 8
The Federal Tort Claims Act has two time limitation periods.
Administrative claims" must be presented within two years of the
instance giving rise to said claim or it will be forever barred." The
action itself must be filed within six months after the date of a
mailing of the notice of final denial6 ' Six months after submission
of the claim, it may be deemed denied by the claimant, and a suit
may be commenced." No state tolling provisions affect this six
month limitation for filing an action."5
Jury trials are not permitted.' However, counsel may request
an advisory jury to assist the judge in determining questions of
fact." Punitive damages cannot be recovered against the United
States." Finally, the Federal Tort Claims Act establishes a ceiling
on the attorney's fee. It cannot exceed 25 percent of the judgment
or settlement made after the action is filed with the court.' If the
case is settled in the claims procedures stage, prior to filing the
action, the fee cannot exceed 20 percent of such settlement. 8
Servicemen on active duty or their heirs cannot recover from the
government under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries or
5628 U.S.C. S 2675(a) (1974).
57Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1971).
' Robinson v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
s9 Standard Form 95.
6°28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1974).
61 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1974); Childers v. United States, 442 F.2d 1299 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971); Claremont Aircraft, Inc. v. United
States, 420 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1970).
6528 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1974).
63 Brown v. United States, 353 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1965).
-28 U.S.C. S 2402 (1970); O'Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).65 Schetter v. Housing Authority, 132 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
6628 U.S.C. S 2674 (1965).
6728 U.S.C. S 2678 (1974).
"28 U.S.C. 5 2678 (1974).
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deaths sustained "incident to service."' 9 However, nothing prevents
a serviceman or his heirs from suing a third party tort-feasor, such
as an aircraft manufacturer."0
It is unsettled whether a case involving a violation of Federal
Aviation Regulations presents a "federal question," thus giving fed-
eral courts subject matter jurisdiction absent diversity. There is con-
flicting authority," and resolution hopefully is forthcoming.
It has been held that plaintiff could join a non-diverse defendant
with the U.S.A. under the doctrine of "pendent jurisdiction," so
that all his claims could be decided in one proceeding, thereby
fostering judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants."2
THE PROS AND CONS OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
Federal admiralty jurisdiction,7" or the application of general
maritime principles on the "law side" of the federal court, or in
state court, offers advantages to the aviation personal injury or
wrongful death plaintiff that he may not have elsewhere. The most
obvious one is the general liberality of maritime law. It applies com-
parative negligence rather than the harsh doctrines of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk." Unlike diversity or general
federal question cases, no minimum amount in controversy is re-
quired. Additionally, venue in admiralty may be laid properly in
any district court in which service of process on defendant can be
effected.7" A possible drawback to the choice of this jurisdiction,
6 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
"Boeing Aircraft Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961); O'Keefe v.
Boeing Aircraft Co., 335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
11 Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (upholding
federal question jurisdiction); D'Arcy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 12 Av. Cas.
18,282 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1974) (denying federal question jurisdiction).
"Jacobs v. United States, 367 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Ariz. 1973).
"Admiralty jurisdiction is that original exclusive federal jurisdiction provided
in 28 U.S.C. 5 1333(1) (1970):
The district court shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the
courts of the States, of: (1) Any case of admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which
they are otherwise entitled.
'Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Garrett v. Moore-
McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942). See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (1957).
"' Venue may be properly laid in any federal district in which service of pro-
cess upon the defendant can be effected. Healy, The Admiralty Remedy, LAw
NOTES (Trial Practice) (Oct. 1966). See FED. R. Civ. P. Supplementary Rule 9
for more detailed venue and transfer of venue provisions.
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dependent, of course, on the viewpoint of plaintiff's counsel in
relationship to the type of case he has, is the absence of a jury trial.
However, a jury may be had if it is filed on the "law side" of the
federal district court, where there exist other jurisdictional bases, or
in the state court.
If plaintiff's attorney has a claim which is classifiable as a mari-
time tort and wishes the benefits of maritime law, forum choice
can become involved."M This is so because the "saving to suitors"
clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) permits the maritime claimant to
.elect between the admiralty or law side of the federal court, pro-
vided an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction can be
established for the latter.7" The maritime claimant has the third op-
tion of avoiding federal court by suing in an appropriate state
court."8
Since the unification of civil and admiralty procedure in 1966,
the remaining procedural differences between the two sides of the
federal district court are few; however, plaintiff's attorney should
carefully consider their effect on the outcome of his case before
making an election." Of course, if plaintiff's aviation tort claim
arises under the Federal Death on High Seas Act (FDOHSA)," °
"Craig & Alexander, Wrongful Death in Aviation and the Admiralty Prob-
lems of Federalism, Tempests and Teapots, 37 J. AIR L. & COM. 3 (1971).
"The election is made pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h) which requires
the plaintiff's complaint to include a statement identifying the claim as an ad-
miralty or maritime claim if he desires admiralty jurisdiction. The pleader's iden-
tification of his claim as admiralty or maritime or his failure to do so is not
treated as an irrevocable election and the complaint may be amended pursuant
to FED. R. CIv. P. 15. See C. WluGfrr & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE Civil S 1314 (1969).
11 Like the "law side" of the federal court, the state court offers plaintiff the
advantage of a jury trial. However, plaintiff's attorney should consider the forum
choice factors listed in Parts I, IIA (1 through 3) and III before deciding between
the "law side" of the federal courts and a state court.
. 11 The major procedural difference between the admiralty and civil sides of the
'federal district court is the existence of six Supplemental Rules for Certain Ad-
miralty and Maritime Claims (Rules A-F) which provide special procedures for
attachment and garnishment, limitation of liability, and so on. Other important
differences between the two sides of the federal court can be found in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure themselves; for example, freedom from jury trial on
the admiralty side of the court (Rule 38(e)), the ability in admiralty to take
depositions immediately upon the commencement of the action (Rule 26(a)),
and, admiralty's freedom from the more restrictive venue provisions (e.g., 28
U.S.C. §§ 1391-93 (1970)) applied on the law side of the court (Rule 82).
8042 U.S.C. § 761-68 (1970). The important element of the FDOHSA re-
garding aviation litigation is its application of the mechanical "locality test" for
the determination of maritime torts. Under the Act, any aviation deaths occur-
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which provides an exclusive admiralty remedy for death occurring
beyond a marine league (3 miles) from shore, he will have no
choice.8 Outside the scope of the FDOHSA lie the more hazy areas
for plaintiff's election, including aviation personal injury on or over
the high seas and, until very recently, aviation torts occurring with-
in the 3-mile limit.
In Executive Jet Aviation, Inc., v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, et
al.," the United States Supreme Court took the first step in limiting
the forum variety that the aviation plaintiff has been enjoying by
virtue of the "saving to suitors" clause and the heretofore simplistic
definition of a maritime tort. Executive Jet excluded from federal
admiralty jurisdiction tort claims arising from flights of land-based
aircraft occurring on or over navigable water within state territorial
limits when the aircraft is flying between two points in the conti-
nental United States.8 The case dealt with a commercial airliner,
destined for points within the continental United States, which
crashed into the navigable territorial waters of Lake Erie shortly
after engine ingestion of a flock of seagulls during takeoff.
The underlying issue facing the Court was whether or not it was
going to recognize the creeping extension of federal admiralty jur-
isdiction to aviation accidents occurring in territorial navigable
waters. It decided to call a halt by redefining the concept of mari-
time tort in this area.8" As a result, the "strict locality test" was
rejected as the sole test for determining maritime torts on the
ground that it was established long before airplanes existed and is
no longer meaningful by itself. In its place, the Court created a
new two-pronged test for the determination of maritime torts, re-
taining the locality test as one prong and adding the requirement
that the wrong bear some relationship to traditional maritime ac-
ring on or over the high seas are presumptively maritime torts. Thus, it is under-
standable why admiralty has become a popular forum in the area of aviation
litigation.
"1Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir.
1972).
82405 U.S. 915 (1972).
"1 Comment, Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction and Aircraft Accident Cases: Hops,
Skips, and Jumps into Admiralty, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 53 (1972).
"Executive Jet discredited Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, 203 F. Supp. 430
(E.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd in part, 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 940 (1963). Weinstein gave new life to the locality test of determination of
maritime torts in aviation cases and opened admiralty jurisdiction to aviation
death cases within a marine league from shore, thus, not within the FDOHSA.
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tivity in the absence of legislation to the contrary.' The Supreme
Court applied its new test to the facts before it and found that the
type of aviation in issue bore no relationship to traditional mari-
time activity.
The Court's holding is actually very narrow and inadequate in
several respects. For example, how can the FDOHSA, based on
the locality test of maritime torts, be reconciled with the updated
test of Executive Jet? At one point, the Court reaffirms exclusive
admiralty jurisdiction under the FDOHSA, but at another point
indicates that it plans to put emphasis on its new test to make fed-
eral admiralty jurisdiction "off limits to landbased aircraft"!86 Some
commentators have advocated that the FDOHSA was intended to
be remedial rather than jurisdictional-that is, there is no remedy
for death on the high seas unless death occurred under circum-
stances found to be within federal admiralty jurisdiction. In other
words, they would limit the FDOHSA by requiring the Executive
Jet two-pronged maritime tort test be applied to wrongful death
aviation accidents on or over the high seas, as well.87
The Executive Jet decision seems to put most high sea aviation
personal injury and property damage actions, as contrasted with
wrongful death cases, outside admiralty jurisdiction because most
do not bear the relationship to traditional maritime activity and no
legislation exists bringing such actions within admiralty jurisdic-
tion.8 However, the Court chose not to foreclose the question by
saying it was not deciding whether any aviation tort can ever meet
the second prong of its new test.
The decision leaves the plaintiff's lawyer in uncertainty. Assume
that a commercial aircraft taking off from Miami for New Orleans
" For a recent application of the Executive Jet test, see Higginbotham v.
Mobile Oil Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1167 (W.D. La. 1973); Teachey v. United States,
363 F. Supp. 1197 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
6 The matters with which admiralty is basically concerned have no
conceivable bearing on the operation of aircraft, whether over land
or water .... It is clear, therefore, that neither the fact that a plane
goes down on navigable waters nor the fact that the negligence
'occurs' while a plane is flying over such waters is enough to create
such a relationship to traditional maritime activity as to justify the
invocation of admiralty jurisdiction.
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 270-71 (1972).
87 Bell, Admiralty Jurisdiction in the Wake of Executive Jet, 15 ARIZ. L. REV.
67 (1973).88 Notarian v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Pa. 1965);
Bergeron v. Aero Associates, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. La. 1963).
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crashes into the high seas. What would be the jurisdictional conse-
quences after Executive Jet? Any wrongful death actions would
have exclusive federal admiralty jurisdiction under the FDOHSA.
Any personal injury or property damage actions would probably
be outside of federal admiralty jurisdiction unless a traditional
maritime nexus could be shown. If the destination were changed
from New Orleans to London, it would be uncertain whether a
crash within the 3-mile limit or personal injury or property dam-
age sustained on the high seas would be within admiralty jurisdic-
tion. What about the inter-continental flight that crashes within the
3-mile limit? Again, this question was not decided, but the Court
suggests, in dictum, that one might be able to argue that an inter-
continental flight bears a nexus to traditional maritime activity be-
cause the airplane now has taken the ship's place in transoceanic
inter-continental transportation.
Federal admiralty jurisdiction should be approached with ex-
treme caution until the whole effect of Executive Jet is determined.
If federal jurisdiction is desired, it would be advisable to file either
a companion state action as a safety valve, or be certain that there
is diversity of citizenship just in case the particular court deter-
mines that admiralty jurisdiction does not exist. Otherwise, dis-
missal after the statute of limitations has run would be disastrous.
OBTAINING JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES
As has been illustrated, it is generally possible to find many
courts with proper subject matter jurisdiction. Counsel therefore
must be careful to choose a forum where he can obtain personal
jurisdiction over the maximum number of critical defendants. In
aviation accident litigation, potential defendants include the man-
ufacturer and designer of the airframe, the manufacturer and de-
signer of the engine, and manufacturers and designers of various
component parts. Other possible defendants include the mainten-
ance facility, the present and prior owner(s), and the crew mem-
bers or their estates. If a rental aircraft is involved, the fixed base
operator will be a defendant. If it is a commercial aircraft, the air-
line or air taxi will be a defendant, probably joined as such with
the United States for some negligence of the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration.89 If plaintiff has ascertained his "principal" defendants
"See Section II, on Federal Tort Claim Cases supra.
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before suit is filed, it is essential that personal jurisdiction over
them is assured. If they are not known early in the case, then forum
selection with an eye toward personal jurisdiction over the greatest
number of possible defendants is the goal.
It is unnecessary to find federal authority for assertion of in per-
sonam jurisdiction in federal courts. They are authorized to use
bases of personal jurisdiction available to the courts of the state in
which they are located, including the utilization of state methods
of service and long-arm statutes;" thus, if one's defendants are
amenable to suit in a particular state court, they can likewise be
sued in the federal district courts of that state. Consequently, the
answer to personal jurisdiction is found by comparing the laws of
the different states where the action may be brought.
A brief overview of personal jurisdiction is necessary before con-
sidering the factors affecting forum selection. The basic test for as-
sumption of jurisdiction over the parties is "fair play and substan-
tial justice" as expressed in International Shoe Co. v. Washington."
Without protracted comment, the test boils down to one of reason-
ableness. 2 In applying it, courts will often assess the convenience
of the parties and witnesses and the ease of access to evidence.
International Shoe recognized that forum non conveniens factors
often enter into a determination of in personam jurisdiction. Since
courts often weigh the factors of convenience differently, results
necessarily vary from forum to forum and even among courts with-
in the same state. The aviation attorney faces the problem of
applying these abstractions to his particular defendants.
In personam jurisdiction over defendants who are natural per-
" Advisory Committee Note to 1963 Amendment of FED. R. Civ. P. 4; Ar-
rowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963); Farr & Co. v. CIA
Intercontinental de Navigacion, 243 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1957).
" "[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judg-
ment in personam . . . he have certain minimum contacts (with the forum)
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945).
's [The demands of due process] may be met by such contacts of the
corporation with the state of the forum as make it reasonable . . .
to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is
brought there. An 'estimate of the inconveniences' which would re-
sult to the corporation from a trial away from its 'home' or prin-
cipal place of business is relevant in this connection.
326 U.S. at 317.
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sons has been upheld as "fair and reasonable" on the following
bases:
(i) Physical presence in the jurisdiction,"
(ii) Domicile,"4 citizenship,'5 or residency,"(iii) Consent,'
(iv) Appearance in the action,"
(v) Doing business in the forum, "
(vi) Doing an act within the state,'" or causing an effect in the
state by an act or omission elsewhere."'
Jurisdiction over corporations can be based on factors (iii), (iv),
(v) and (vi) and these additional factors:
(vii) Incorporation within the forum (for domestic corpor-
ations)
(viii) Appointment of an agent for accepting service of pro-
cess.
102
Jurisdiction over domestic corporations may be based on factor
(vii) alone, but obtaining jurisdiction over foreign corporations is
more complex and often involves varying combinations of (v) and
(vii). Counsel's task of securing personal jurisdiction over foreign
corporations is aided immeasurably by state legislation, commonly
know as "long-arm" statutes, which codify one or more of these
bases as a legislative determination of reasonableness.
Illinois was the leader in long-arm legislation. Its statute is typi-
cal and sets forth the specific acts or conduct which bring a de-
fendant within the court's jurisdiction.' California's long-arm
statute is as broad as due process itself and states:
" Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
"'Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
" Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
96 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
11 National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
9
'Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938).
"International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
10 "Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
101 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961); Jeter v. Austin Trailer Equip. Co., 122 Cal. App. 2d 376, 265
P.2d 130 (1953); see Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 13, S 7 (1968).
"92 Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S.
93 (1917).
't (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State,
who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter
enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual,
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A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not in-
consistent with the Constitution of this state or the United States."'
The existence of a long-arm statute in a particular forum is no
magical solution to the problem of personal jurisdiction. Counsel
must still apply the accepted jurisdictional bases to the facts of his
particular case.
The comments below will focus on factor (v), because of its
importance in aviation litigation. The "doing business" basis of
personal jurisdiction has been considerably extended in California
by a Supreme Court decision-Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior
Court."°s In Buckeye, a California plaintiff was injured by a pres-
sure tank manufactured by an Ohio corporation. This Ohio de-
fendant had no normal business contacts with the state of Califor-
nia but sold some of its pressure tanks to an Ohio corporation,
which sold products and maintained a plant in California. Buckeye
filled orders placed in California by the other Ohio corporation,
and shipped some pressure tanks to the California plant. There was
no evidence that Buckeye shipped to the California plant the tank
his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any such
acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within this State;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated
in this State;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located
within this State at the time of contracting;
(e) With respect to actions of divorce and separate maintenance,
the maintenance in this State of a matrimonial domicile at
the time the cause of action arose or the commission in this
State of any act giving rise to the cause of action.
(2) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this State, as provided in this Section,
may be made by personally serving the summons upon the defend-
ant outside this State, as provided in this Act, with the same force
and effect as though summons had been personally served within
this State.
(3) Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein
may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which juris-
diction over him is based upon this Section.
(4) Nothing herein contained limits or affects the right to serve
any process in any other manner now or hereafter provided by law.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968).
'04 CAL. CODE CIv. P. S 410.10 (West 1973). See generally Gorfinkel & La-
vine, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in California under New Section 410.10 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 21 HAST. L.J. 1163 (1970).
'1*71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
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which injured the plaintiff. The court employed a two-step analysis:
first, personal jurisdiction depended on a "threshold of sufficient
economic activity." This "threshold" can be established:
whenever the purchase or use of a (manufacturer's) product with-
in a state generates gross income for the manufacturer and is not
so fortuitous or unforeseeable as to negate the existence of an in-
tent on the manufacturer's part as to bring about the result."°
Even prior to Buckeye, California courts adopted an expansive
view of "doing business." Where a foreign corporation made sales
through its agents or by direct mail," ' or through an exclusive sales
agent,"' or got the benefit of maintaining a sales force through a
non-exclusive sales-representative, or an unincorporated distributor,
it was subject to personal jurisdiction in California.10 The second
phase of the court's analysis was a forum non conveniens balancing
test (alluded to in International Shoe) to determine the reason-
ableness of requiring a defendant foreign corporation to defend a
suit in the forum court. Even with a liberal definition of "doing
business," as adopted in Buckeye, courts will still "balance the in-
conveniences" as an ingredient of personal jurisdiction. Thus, coun-
sel must be familiar with the doctrine of forum non conveniens0
and also with the possibility of the transfer of the action not with-
standing existence of subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdic-
tion, and proper venue."'
One possible problem may arise with the "doing business"
jurisdictional basis when the cause of action bears no relationship
to defendant's economic activity within the state. Personal juris-
diction has been held to be absent in situations wherein the plain-
tiff brings the cause of action in his home state against a foreign
corporation for injuries received in a third state."' This defense of
1I0 Id. at 902, 458 P.2d at 64, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
107 Gordon Armstrong Co. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 211, 325 P.2d
21 (1958).
100 Eclipse Fuel Eng'r Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 736, 307 P.2d
739 (1957).
109Sales Affiliates, Inc. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 2d 134, 214 P.2d 541
(1950).
"'Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
" This latter topic is discussed more fully in the venue section of this article.
11 Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1959); but see Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952).
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"no relation" has had little success when the cause of action arises
within the forum state, even though it is unrelated to defendant's
in-state activities.1 3
Another possible problem with long-arm jurisdiction may come
up when counsel attempts to assert personal jurisdiction over a
parent corporation based upon the presence of a subsidiary corpor-
ation within the forum. The mere existence of a subsidiary within
the jurisdiction has been held insufficient, without more, to sub-
ject the parent to personal jurisdiction of the forum.' However,
where the parent is reaping the economic benefit of the subsidiary's
conduct, under the rationale of Sales Affiliates, Inc. ' this should
suffice for personal jurisdiction. Buckeye's reference to generation
of gross income as a contact and that court's emphasis upon eco-
nomic reality can be persuasive in rebutting the claim of lack of
personal jurisdiction.
On the other hand, one of the primary reasons for setting up
parent and subsidiary corporations is to shield the parent from lia-
bility. At least one recent federal case apparently has held that such
a corporate structure will accomplish this intended purpose."' How-
ever, this result seems to be incorrect given the broad gross income
and "commercial actuality" language in Buckeye, and another re-
cent federal court decision."' In New York, this difficulty is elimi-
nated by treating the subsidiary as a branch of the foreign parent
corporation. ' This approach appears to be better reasoned; to hold
otherwise would exalt form over substance to the prejudice of the
injured plaintiff.
The above general principles should be kept in mind when con-
sidering the personal jurisdiction aspects of forum selection. To be
realistic, most lawyers will want to file suit in their home state,
where they are familiar with the courts and the law. This is be-
coming generally more possible with the widespread adoption of
"' Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80
Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
114 Canon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
I1" Sales Affiliates, Inc. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 2d 134, 214 P.2d 541
(1950).
16 Aanestad v. Beech Aircraft, Civil No. 73-398 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
" Johnson v. Express Lift Co., Civil No. 72-1104 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
118 Boryk v. De Havilland Aircraft Co., 341 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965); Taca
Int'l Airlines S.A. v. Rolls-Royce of England, Ltd., 15 N.Y.2d 97, 204 N.E.2d
329, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1965).
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long-arm legislation permitting personal jurisdiction over foreign
corporations. However, convenience of counsel should not be the
ultimate criterion. As discussed, the nature of aviation litigation
often does not permit counsel to know his principal defendants
prior to filing suit. His suit, therefore, should be placed in a forum
where he has personal jurisdiction over as many defendants as pos-
sible. This requires a thorough examination of the bases of personal
jurisdiction available in the potential forums. The end result of his
case will often be a function of the care with which he conducted
the examination.
LAYING THE PROPER VENUE
Once jurisdiction in a state or federal court is established, the
next issue is the choice of the proper "place" for the trial of the
action. This brings into play the rules of venue. Their purpose is
to locate the litigation in a forum mutually convenient for the
litigants. State and federal venue provisions differ widely, although
sometimes overlapping, and the federal rules usually provide a
greater number of locales than do the states. In state court actions,
for example, the question usually involves the selection of a proper
county for trial; whereas, in federal court, the query relates to the
most appropriate federal judicial district. Venue "is not a qualifica-
tion upon the power of the court to adjudicate, but a limitation
designed for the convenience of litigants."'
119
In most states, the placing of venue is governed by statutes which
characteristically provide that venue is proper in the county in
which any defendant resides. There are also provisions in some
states for venue in the county where the cause of action arose-
such as the place of injury in tort actions or the designated place of
performance of an obligation in contract actions."'
Federal venue provisions for diversity and federal question cases
are codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which is sub-divided into sections
that set forth differing rules corresponding to the type of defendant
involved. Section 1391 (a) for example, pertains to diversity cases
involving individual (as opposed to corporate) defendants. Venue
in such situations is proper in the judicial district (1) where all
plaintiffs reside, (2) where all defendants reside, or (3) where the
"I' Oldberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 340 (1953).
.. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 395 (West 1973).
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claim arose. In federal question cases, however, section 1391 (b)
controls and provides that venue is proper (1) where all the de-
fendants reside or (2) where the claim arose, except as otherwise
provided by law. Section 1391 (b) permits an alien to be sued in
any district.
Since the plaintiffs in aviation cases often find themselves facing
corporate defendants in a federal forum, special attention should be
paid to section 1391 (c) of 28 U.S.C. That section provides that a
plaintiff may sue a corporate defendant in the judicial district
where the defendant corporation is (1) incorporated, (2) licensed
to do business or (3) doing business. Note, in this regard, that a
corporation which is licensed or incorporated by the State is deem-
ed a resident of each federal judicial district within that state, and
thus venue is proper in any of such districts." 1 Furthermore, when
defendants reside in different districts in the same state, and plain-
tiff is unable to satisfy the requirements of section 1391, he may
sue them in any of the districts in which one of them resides.'
For actions brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, venue
is proper only in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides or
where the act or omission occured."' And in admiralty actions, the
venue provision is even broader."
There are several practical considerations which plaintiff's at-
torney must take into account in selecting venue in a state or fed-
eral forum. The length of the trial calendar, the local pretrial con-
ference policy, the experience and reputation of the bench, the
court's location in relation to the residences of the witnesses, the
convenience and expense of trying a case in a certain locale, the
attitude of the jurors, and the probable verdict range for compar-
able cases must be carefully weighed before a final determination
is made.
The importance of selecting the proper venue cannot be over-
emphasized--especially with respect to actions brought in certain
states whose rules relating to improper selection of venue are rather
harsh. In California, for example, a plaintiff who has chosen an
improper forum may find himself entirely at the mercy of the de-
121 1 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.142 [5.-3] n.25 (2d ed. 1974).
12228 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1948).
1228 U.S.C. § 1402 (1958).
" See part II. A. 4. of this article.
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fendant. California rules provide that, where plaintiff has selected
an improper venue and the parties cannot agree to a mutually
convenient venue, defendant may object and designate any proper
court in the county in which the action was commenced or any
other proper county as the place for trial."n
The federal rules regarding improper selection of venue are not
quite so harsh, in that plaintiff's errant choice gives rise to a trans-
fer of the action to any proper judicial district as designated by the
court rather than by the defendant. "' It is important to note, how-
ever, that federal courts still have the statutory power to dismiss
a case brought in a district having improper venue. Therefore,
venue selection is a step in the forum-choice process that should
not be taken lightly.
CHANGE OF VENUE-THE SPECTRE
OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Once again, venue deals with the convenience of the litigants
rather than the authority of a court to hear a particular matter.
Out of this concept of convenience has grown a doctrine known as
forum non conveniens which gives the court discretion to refuse
to hear a case even though jurisdiction and venue requirements
have been met.""
On the state level, the application of this doctrine may lead to
dismissal of a properly filed action. 8 The classic forum non con-
veniens case arises in aviation actions where defendant manufac-
turer is subject to jurisdiction and proper venue in several states,
and a non-resident plaintiff sues in a state other than that where
the accident occurred. Defendant's goal in making his motion may
be to move the action to a low-verdict state and/or one where it
might be able to impanel a more friendly jury. Since the place of
the accident may be such a locale, defendant may well argue that
the action should have been brought there because all the eyewit-
nesses are available, the evidence is there, the site of the crash can
'2 CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 398 (West 1973).
22 28 U.S.C. S 1406(a) (1960).
127 Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 30 U.S. 501 (1947).
12 For an exhaustive checklist of the factors considered by state courts, see
Great Northern R.R. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 3d 105, 90 Cal. Rptr. 461
(1970).
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be easily viewed, and so on. Defendant manufacturer may also ad-
vocate the state of its principal place of business as the more con-
venient place since it is the location of the corporate records and
key personnel. To prevail, defendant must show that it will be
subjected to some degree of hardship by plaintiff's initial choice
of venue and that another appropriate forum is available. If plain-
tiff is a domiciliary of the original forum state' or if the accident
occurred there, defendant's motion will have little chance of success.
Gulf Oil v. Gilbert" introduced the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens to the federal courts; and this development was soon fol-
lowed by the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a), which was
"drafted in accordance with the doctrine.''. It provides:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought."'
Section 1404 (a) motions generally are granted on a lesser showing
of inconvenience than required for a forum non conveniens dis-
missal on the state court level."' Although a more relaxed federal
standard for forum non conveniens transfer could be considered a
disadvantage of the federal forum, if defendant's motion is granted
the transferee federal court must apply the substantive law which
the transferor court would have applied.'' The effect is that de-
fendant cannot change plaintiff's original choice of law decision by
making a Section 1404(a) motion. In comparison, if a plaintiff's
action in a state court is dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds and he is forced to file in another state, he would be at
the mercy of the latter's choice of law rule, which might well
point to an entirely different body of stubstantive law than the state
of his choice.
129 Thompson v. Continental Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 738, 427 P.2d 765, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 101 (1967).
1"0330 U.S. 501 (1947).
"' 1 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 0.14511] at 1751 n.1 (2d ed. 1969).
"' For a good introduction to this Section, see generally Annot., 1 A.L.R.
Fed. 15 (1969). For consideration of 28 U.S.C. S 1404(a) with regard to 28
U.S.C. § 1407 as weapons available to the defendant in federal courts, see Com-
ment, Consolidation and Transfer in the Federal Courts: 28 U.S.C. Section 1407
Viewed in the Light of Rule 42(a) and 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a), 22 HAST. L.J.
1289 (1971).
131Norwood v. Kilpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955).
"'Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
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Like state forum non conveniens, the section 1404 (a) test is a
balancing of factors of convenience. Unless the balance is strongly
in favor of defendant, plaintiff's choice of forum is rarely dis-
turbed." The primary factors for consideration that were laid
down in the landmark forum non conveniens case of Gulf Oil v.
Gilbert and are still relevant to cases under section 1404(a) in-
clude: the ease of access to a source of proof, the availability of
compulsory process for the attendance of unwilling witnesses, the
cost of compelling attendance, relative calendar congestion and
the interests of justice."' Factors which are not generally considered
include the relative size of the damage awards in different forums,"7
the number of available witnesses as opposed to the actual im-
portance of their testimony,' 8 and the convenience of counsel as
distinguished from the convenience of the parties."9
It must be noted that the effect of a transfer for convenience of
witnesses differs significantly from the effect of transfer due to
improper venue [28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)]. Under 1404(a), the place
of trial may be changed in order to accommodate parties and wit-
nesses even if venue is proper where the action is originally filed.
The effect of such a transfer is a change in the place of trial, not in
the applicable law." On the other hand, where venue is improper,
the action may be transferred to a place where it could have been
brought. Since venue is improper, plaintiff has no right to use the
transferor district's choice of law rule, substantive law, statutes of
"' Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp.,
431 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1970).
.. Norwood v. Kilpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955).
1 Chicago R.I. & P. R.R. v. Igloe, 220 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1955).
"' Peyser v. General Motors Corp., 158 F. Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
"'Blue Bell, Inc. v. Jayman-Ruby, Inc., 311 F.2d 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Glenn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 31 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); Cressman
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). In balancing the
forum non conveniens factors of forum choice, plaintiff should consider that a
limitation on the exercise of a district court's discretion in dealing with Section
1404(a) motions is the strict requirement that the transferee district must be one
where the plaintiff might have been able to bring the action initially. This means
that jurisdiction and venue must have been originally proper in the transferee
judicial district. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1960). In this respect,
Section 1404(a) is considered to be narrower than the non-statutory doctrine of
forum non conveniens. Also, if the federal court determines the state court to
be the most convenient forum, it may dismiss the case. Altman v. Central of Ga.
R.R., 254 F. Supp. 167 (E.D. Ga. 1965).
"'Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
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limitation, etc., and the transferee court will apply its local law to
the cause."'
Consideration of the forum non conveniens factors is essential
in the jurisdiction and venue choice process. Plaintiff will want to
minimize defendant's opportunity to dismiss or transfer the action
to a venue which is more favorable to defendant than himself.
Plaintiff is more susceptible to a transfer in the federal forum and
will have no control over the choice of the transferee forum. In
state court, plaintiff will have a better chance to protect his initial
choice and may be the one to choose a new forum if a state court
dismisses his action on forum non conveniens grounds. However,
a defendant who has removed a case from state to federal court
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 may then make a section 1404(a) motion
to transfer the action to a distant venue." Therefore, consideration
of the forum non conveniens factors is a key element in the state-
federal forum choice decision.
PICKING THE MOST FAVORABLE LAW-
THE CHOICE OF LAW INQUIRY.
Aviation is a multistate activity; thus, several states may have
an interest in a crash resulting from a defect in an aircraft's man-
ufacture. Consider the situation wherein a Texas businessman pur-
chases and takes delivery in California of a light aircraft manufac-
tured in Kansas. On its maiden flight from California to Texas, the
plane crashes in the Nevada desert, killing the businessman and
his colleague from Oklahoma. Investigation reveals that a defect
in the plane's design was the reason for the crash. Assuming that
the businessman's wife can obtain personal jurisdiction over de-
fendant manufacturer in Texas, Kansas, California or Nevada and
that state or federal subject matter jurisdiction and venue require-
ments could be satisfied in all four states, which state, choice of law-
wise, would be the most favorable forum for the resulting wrongful
death product liability action? The foregoing fact pattern is not
at all unusual because the typical aviation product liability case is
one for wrongful death. This question can only be answered after
plaintiff's attorney analyzes the choice of law rules and relevant
'"' Geehan v. Monahan, 382 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1967).
4 McGraw-Edison Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 322 F. Supp. 1049 (E.D.
Wis. 1971).
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substantive and procedural law-e.g., wrongful death acts, statute
of limitation, borrowing statutes and products liability law-of all
four contact states above.'"
Where more than one state has "sufficiently substantial contact"
with the activity in question, the forum, by analysis of the interests
possessed by the states involved, should apply the statute and case
law of one or another state having the greatest interest.1'" In other
words, filing an action in State A does not insure that its procedur-
al and substantive law will govern the issues of the case. The forum
court commonly recognizes that other states have contacts with a
particular multistate activity giving rise to interests which may re-
quire the application of their law to the issues raised in State A.
As a result, choice of law rules have been fashioned which serve
to help the forum court apply the law of the state which has the
predominant or significant interest in the accident in question.
Plaintiff's attorney must determine which state's choice of law rule
will permit the application of the substantive law most favorable
to his case.
It should be made clear that choice of law considerations pres-
ently do not enter into the decision whether to file in a federal or
state court when both sit in the same state, and the potential basis
for federal subject matter jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship.''
On the other hand, if the basis for federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion is federal question, the federal court will apply federal law
143 This section on choice of law serves only as an introduction to the various
choice of law rules. No attempt will be made to discuss choice of law in regard
to each of the aforementioned areas of law; however, choice of law as it applies
to products liability actions will be briefly discussed.
""Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
' Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Klaxon held
that a federal court sitting in a diversity action should apply the forum state's
choice of law rules. This means that a federal court should reach the same choice
of law result as the court of the state in which it sits. Some commentators criti-
cize Klaxon-a product of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)-for put-
ting federal courts in a straitjacket as to choice of law matters. They advocate
an independent choice of law rule for the federal courts. They recognize that the
short term effect of their suggestion would result in forum-shopping between
the state and federal court sitting in the same state, but the long term effect
probably would be uniformity in choice of law rules with the federal courts taking
the lead. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1st ed.
1971); Carpenter, Pluralistic Legislative Jurisdiction: Plaintif's Choice under the
Klaxon Rule, 4C IND. L.J. 477 (1965). For a good discussion of choice of law in
federal diversity aviation actions, see Bailey & Broder, Choice of Law-Mass Dis-
aster Cases Involving Diversity of Citizenship, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 285 (1972).
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rather than state law. In Federal Tort Claims Act actions, 28
U.S.C. 5 1346(b)' provides a built-in choice of law rule which is
"the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." Richards
v. United States'4 7 added a little flexibility to this rather rigid rule
by interpreting it to mean the "whole law" of the state where the
act or omission occurred, which should include the state's choice of
law rule as well as its substantive law. Thus, if a Federal Tort
Claims Act action is filed in the federal district court in State A
for an aviation accident occurring in State B, the federal court
could rely on any flexibility provided in the State B choice of law
rule rather than being forced to apply its substantive law only. By
comparison, in most maritime actions, choice of substantive law
is not such a problem. This is so because if a case is classified as
maritime, it must be governed by maritime principles, even if it
is tried by a state court or in a federal diversity court applying state
law.' 8 Since the great majority of aviation products liability cases
brought in federal court are based on diversity of citizenship, the fo-
cus in choice of law will be on the rules of the various states, and it
will become clear that there is a dreadful lack of uniformity among
them. They have and are still undergoing a great deal of metamor-
phosis. At present there are three basic varities: (1) the vested
rights or territorial approach embodied in the Restatement of Con-
flict of Laws, (2) the Restatement of Conflict of Laws' most signifi-
cant contacts approach, and (3) governmental interest analysis.
The vested rights rules are entirely too rigid for conflict analysis
in our modern industrialized and consumer-oriented society. States
which still apply this approach first characterize an action as being
a tort, contract, property or other type of action. A choice of law
rule, in which the most important contact has been predetermined,
is then applied to the action to find the appropriate law. For exam-
ple, the traditional choice of law rule for tort actions is called lex
loci delecti, or place of wrong or injury, which means that the rule
considers the place of wrong to be the significant contact; therefore,
the substantive law of the place of wrong will be applied regardless
of the importance of any contacts the state may have.
14 9
I" Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. S 1346 (1974).
147369 U.S. 1 (1962).
'8Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Haru, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1945).
' Texas is an example of a state which clings to lex loci delecti in wrong-
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In the early 1960's, states openly began to revolt against "vested
rights" as being a superficial approach to conflict analysis.' New
York helped lead the assault with its "grouping of contact" or "cen-
ter of gravity" approach in tort and contract cases. A weakness of
the center of gravity test is that it is susceptible to mechanical con-
tact counting rather than meaningful analysis. 5' Nevertheless, the
Restatement (2d) of Conflict of Laws abandoned the vested rights
approach to choice of law problems for its own version of the most
significant contacts test."' The Restatement approach lists the sig-
nificant contacts for contract actions and encourages plaintiff to
ful death actions. Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex.
1968); Click v. Thuron Indus., Inc., 460 S.W.2d 506 (1972). Texas' rationale
for this is an early Texas case that interpreted its wrongful death statue as having
no extraterritorial effect. However, there is an indication that Texas has adopted
the more liberal interest analysis in personal injury cases. Lederle v. United Serv.
Auto Ass'n, 394 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); Seguros Tepeyac S.A. v.
Bostrom, 347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965). See Comment, At the Crossroads-Lex
Loci Delictis or Most Significant Relationship, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 359 (1972).
"' Much of this activity was centered in California and New York. For ex-
ample, in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961), New York "escaped" a harsh tort lex loci delecti result by
refusing to apply Massachusett's limit on wrongful death damages in a case
arising out of a Massachusetts plane crash. The holding was based partially on
New York's public policy as reflected in a state constitutional provision and on
characterization of wrongful death damage provisions as procedural. Other ex-
amples of courts "escaping" from the vested rights approach in tort actions in-
clude: Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Emery v.
Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Haumschild v. Continental Cas.
Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959). Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124
N.E.2d 99 (1954), was an early contract case ignoring vested rights for a group-
ing of contacts approach. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279,
240 N.Y. Supp. 2d 743 (1963), followed Auten by applying its reasoning to a
tort host-guest case. See generally Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent
Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1963)-comments
by Professors Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar and Reese.
1 See Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463
(1965), for an illustration of how reliance on contact counting can cause dis-
torted results. Two other New York opinions, Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d
289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966), and Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d
569, 241 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969), did their best to distinguish
Dym to reach more logical results. See also Public Adm'r v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
224 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), involving a crash in Florida of a plane manu-
factured in New Jersey and sold in California. The flight originated in Florida
and the only contact between the parties took place in Florida. The court held
the action was governed by Florida law, and no rationale was given why the
Florida contacts were the "most significant contacts."
2' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145, is the tort choice
of law test:
1. The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in
tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with re-
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consider the qualitative factors of its section 6 in determining the
state with the most significant contacts. The inherent danger in this
approach is that it too may easily degenerate into "contact count-
ing" because there are no real standards for determining which
state has the most significant contacts.
The final major choice of law approach is government interest
analysis."' This approach is a step in the correct direction in that
it endeavors to take a more qualitative stance. The courts following
this approach isolate the competing laws, determining underlying
policy for the laws, compare the policies to see if they conflict, and
try to solve the conflict, if one exists. However, the analysis tends
to break down in two spots. First, how are courts going to go about
ascertaining the policy underlying a particular piece of legislation?
Oftentimes, this will amount to guesswork and is more idealistic
than practical. Second, by what method are the courts going to
solve "true conflicts"-that is, situations where the underlying
policies of the two states cannot be reconciled? As to the second
fault, practically every commentator in the field has his own "pet"
solution. Some rely on a mechanical forum-preference approach to
spect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the oc-
currence and the parties under the principles stated in Section 6.
2. Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of
Section 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the par-
ties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered. These contacts are to be evaluated according to
their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
The Restatement's contract choice of law test (Section 188) is basically identical
to the tort test; however, the contacts for consideration are typical contract con-
tacts.
15a See generally R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
231 et seq. (1st ed. 1971). California led the way with this approach in Reich v.
Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967). Reich was a
wrongful death action involving an automobile accident in Missouri. At the time
of the crash, plaintiff's decedent was an Ohio domiciliary who was enroute to
California in order to become a California domiciliary. Defendant was a Cali-
fornia domiciliary. California and Ohio had no limits on wrongful death recov-
ery, but Missouri had a $25,000 limit. California, a disinterested forum, balanced
the interest of the litigants and of the involved states and held that Ohio had the
substantial interest; therefore, Ohio law was applied as to wrongful death dam-
ages. See also Hurtado v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 176, 110 Cal. Rptr.
591 (1973); Ryan v. Clark Equip. Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 679, 74 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1969). For application of Reich to a products liability personal injury case aris-
ing in a foreign country, see Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711,
101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972).
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the resolution,"' while others have concocted elaborate checklists
of "choice-influencing considerations.' 15 5
The problem of choice of law in products liability cases is put
in perspective when the attorney recognizes that choice of law rules
and the law of products liability have undergone simultaneous
revolutionary development in the last 15 years. Choice of law is
moving away from a desire for mechanical uniformity toward an
analytical case-by-case approach. Similarly, substantive products
liability law is discrediting the privity-limited versions of negligence
and breach of warranty for the enterprise liability concepts of
breach of warranty without privity" and strict liability in tort.""
The concurrent developments have not at all been uniform, and
this is what makes choice of law in products liability confusing." '
Even nearly universal adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) has not brought uniformity in the breach of war-
ranty approach to products liability."9 Variations in the issues of
who may sue and who may be sued are generated as states have
either modified portions of the UCC or have refused to adopt cer-
tain sections." The high courts of only 22 states, so far, have
expressly adopted strict liability in tort, while others have either
inferentially adopted strict liability in tort or rely on the strained
concept of warranty without privity or other more conventional
theories.' So, plaintiff's attorney must take caution to find the
theory which will enable him to recover from the defendants he
1"4B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963 ed.).
1' R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (1st ed. 1968).
15 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d
1 (1960).
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 420A (1969); Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. App. 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
'"See Ehrenzweig, Products Liability in the Conflict of Laws-Toward a
Theory of Enterprise Liability Under 'Foreseeable and Insurable Laws': 11, 69
YALE L.J. 794 (1960); Kiihne, Choice of Law in Products Liability, 60 CALIF. L.
REV. 1 (1972); Note, Products Liability and the Choice of Law, 78 HARV. L.
REV. 1452 (1965).
"' Weintraub, Choice of Law for Products Liability: The Impact of the Uni-
form Commercial Code and Recent Developments in Conflicts Analysis, 44 TExAs
L. REV. 1429 (1966).
160A prime example is UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, which deals
with privity (i.e., the relationship between the contracting seller and buyer). See
generally White & Summers, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 331 n.16 (Ist ed. 1972).
"I CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. § 4070 (1974).
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wishes to sue. In states which accept strict liability in tort, a user,
consumer, and, in some states, a bystander,"' will be able to sue
the manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer, maintainer and others in
the distributive chain. It is possible that warranty actions in some
states may be as broad or even broader than the strict liability in
tort action, but that depends on that jurisdiction's particular adop-
tion or modification of the warranty provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
None of the three major choice of law approaches specifically
deals with products liability. In fact, the vested rights approach
emphasizes characterization. It is evident how this would cause con-
fusion when applied to the products liability action-a hybrid of
tort and warranty contract theories.6 ' However, the products lia-
bility action is considered to be more of a tort-based theory than a
contract theory,1" and choice of law is moving towards interest
analysis approaches which cut across the theoretical labels and
make it easier to analyze products liability actions.
There is no simple solution to the choice of law stage of picking
a forum in the aviation products liability action. The best approach
is to seek application of the most liberal products liability law, and
that is usually the law that permits the largest class of plaintiffs to
sue the maximum number of defendants. This requires plaintiff to
research the products liability law of the states which have contact
with the incident--e.g., the place of the accident, of manufacture,
of sale and delivery of the aircraft, and the place where the plain-
tiffs and defendants are domiciled. The plaintiff should then classi-
fy the choice of law rules of all potentially acceptable forums in
order to decide on the forum whose rule will most probably apply
the most favorable products liability law. Of course, the forum's
approach to the applicable statute of limitations, wrongful death
act, etc., are also material considerations. It is easy to see that lack
of uniformity in choice of law rules and products liability law make
choice of law a most challenging element in the decision on where
to sue.
12 California extended strict liability to the protection of bystanders in Elmore
v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1969).
" It has been advocated that characterization has no place in products liabil-
ity. See Kihne, supra note 158, and Weintraub, supra note 159 at 1437-38.
'."See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 656 (4th ed. 1971).
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CONCLUSION
The ideal forum for the plaintiff is not an unattainable goal.
Products liability law is constantly expanding in recognition of the
need for consumer protection on a national and international basis.
The standards for establishing personal jurisdiction over out-of-
state defendants have been considerably relaxed, properly reflect-
ing the oneness of this country and the fact that aviation products
are rarely confined to state and national boundaries. Discovery
rules are opening doors and disclosing information hitherto for-
bidden to the victims of airplane crashes. In many states jury
verdicts are now beginning to award damages commensurate with
the actual losses sustained. Along with these trends, we have the
uncertainty and confusion in the area of choice of law and the
prospect of a period of uncertainty in the interpretation of the new
federal rules of evidence until appellate decisions bring to them
some uniformity.
Amidst these developments the plaintiff's attorney must make
crucial decisions both as to parties and forum. Since aviation is an
activity which transcends state and international boundaries, so
must counsel broaden his horizon and think "spatially" in terms
of jurisdiction, venue and choice of law. It is hoped that this
article will be of assistance to him in arriving at decisions which
will lead to an equitable and just result for his client.
